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Oil and political survival

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  • Andersen, Jørgen Juel
  • Aslaksen, Silje

Abstract

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 100 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 89-106

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:100:y:2013:i:1:p:89-106

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

Related research

Keywords: Political survival; Oil; Natural resources; Institutions;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Egil Matsen & Ragnar Torvik & Gisle J. Natvik, 2012. "Petro populism," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology 12812, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
  2. Frederick Van der Ploeg & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "War and Natural Resource Exploitation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3244, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. John Anyanwu & Andrew E. O. Erhijakpor, 2013. "Working Paper 184 - Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa?," Working Paper Series, African Development Bank 988, African Development Bank.
  4. Markwardt, Gunther & Farzanegan, Mohammad & Leßmann, Christian, 2013. "Natural-resource rents and internal conflicts - Can decentralization lift the curse?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79940, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Naghavi, Alireza, 2011. "Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 740-748.
  6. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2014. "Resource rents, power, and political stability," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201419, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  7. Perez Nino, Helena & Le Billon, Philippe, 2013. "Foreign aid, resource rents and institution-building in Mozambique and Angola," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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