Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability

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Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability

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Ronen Bar-El ()

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 138 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 29-44
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:138:y:2009:i:1:p:29-44

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Other versions:
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Other versions:
- Jody Overland, Kenneth Simons and Michael Spagat, 2003. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/11, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
- Jody Overland & Kenneth L. Simons & Michael Spagat, 2000. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 354, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
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- Sah, Raaj Kumar, 1991. "Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nauro F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2003. "Aggregate Investment and Political Instability: An Econometric Investigation," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(279), pages 533-549, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sargent, Thomas J & Velde, Francois R, 1995. "Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 474-518, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Usher, Dan, 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- Dan Usher, 1986. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," Working Papers 671, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
Bourguignon, F. & Verdier, T., 1997. "Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth," DELTA Working Papers 97-10, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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- Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Muhammed N. Islam & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Tinpots, Totalitarians (and Democrats): An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Economic Growth on Civil Liberties and Political Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 289-323, 03. [Downloadable!]

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