Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 138 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Dictatorship; Growth; Political stability; Repression; D74; H11; H50; O10; O40;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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