The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
AbstractThe paper extends and empirically tests Gordon Tullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935-1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession in an autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 103 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2000. "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 63-84, April.
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