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Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression

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  • Grigory V. Kalyagin

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University)

  • Vladimir A. Kozlov

    (Department of Demography, National Research University - Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi- democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.

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File URL: http://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/Category/x1a/xb1/6833/file/0001.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0001.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upa:wpaper:0001

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Related research

Keywords: Dictatorship; Stalinism; Repression; Plan; Principal-Agent;

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References

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  1. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 4777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, October.
  3. Byeongju Jeong, 2001. "Bad Policies Under an Autocrat's Production," Public Economics 0012002, EconWPA.
  4. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2000. " The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 63-84, April.
  5. Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March.
  6. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
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