Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression
AbstractThis paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi- democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0001.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Dictatorship; Stalinism; Repression; Plan; Principal-Agent;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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