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Politicians: Be Killed or Survive

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Benno Torgler

Abstract

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2008. "Politicians: Be Killed or Survive," IEW - Working Papers 391, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:391
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    File URL: https://www.econ.uzh.ch/apps/workingpapers/wp/iewwp391.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Bjørnskov & Andreas Freytag, 2016. "An offer you can’t refuse: murdering journalists as an enforcement mechanism of corrupt deals," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 221-243, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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