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Politicians: Be Killed or Survive

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Benno Torgler

Abstract

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 391.

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Date of creation: Oct 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:391

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Keywords: Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection.;

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Cited by:
  1. Andreas Freytag & C. Björnskov, 2011. "An Offer You Can't Refuse: Murdering Journalists as an Enforcement Mechanism of Corrupt Deals," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2011-014, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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