Politicians: Be Killed or Survive
AbstractIn the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2008-25.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2008. "Politicians: Be Killed or Survive," IEW - Working Papers 391, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2009. "Politicians: Be Killed or Survive," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 242, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2008. "Politicians: Be Killed or Survive," CESifo Working Paper Series 2483, CESifo Group Munich.
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2008-11-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-25 (Positive Political Economics)
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