From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 11 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
democracy; Schumpeter; equal political participation; barriers to entry;
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