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The political economy of imperial power successions in ancient China

Author

Listed:
  • Yaguang Zhang

    (Peking University)

  • Sitian Yu

    (Capital University of Economics and Business)

  • Shengyi Zhang

    (Peking University)

Abstract

This paper studies the succession of power between emperor and crown prince in imperial China as a political game. We begin by developing a model of the succession game that defines the probability of a crown prince being deposed as a function of the strength of the ruling emperor. The model predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of crown prince-deposition and the strength of the ruler. We then test the model’s implication against the historical evidence. We find that from the Western Han Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty (206 BC–1644 AD), the power of crown princes first increased, then fluctuated and finally decreased. This trend was linearly correlated to changes in relative imperial power.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaguang Zhang & Sitian Yu & Shengyi Zhang, 2023. "The political economy of imperial power successions in ancient China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 137-166, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:197:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01085-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01085-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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