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Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario

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  • Kevin Morrison

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    Abstract

    Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 131 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 365-386

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:131:y:2007:i:3:p:365-386

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

    Related research

    Keywords: Democratization; Natural resources; Foreign aid; Redistribution;

    References

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    1. Svensson, J., 1995. "When Is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality," Papers 600, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    2. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1997. "Aid, policies, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1777, The World Bank.
    3. Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 3422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226731445 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ardagna, Silvia & Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 2002. "Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment," Scholarly Articles 3353756, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2001-03, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    8. Adam Przeworski, 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 253-273, June.
    9. Lancaster, Carol, 1999. "Aid to Africa," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226468389.
    10. Feyzioglu, Tarhan & Swaroop, Vinaya & Zhu, Min, 1998. "A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 12(1), pages 29-58, January.
    11. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    13. Knack, Stephen, 2003. "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?," MPRA Paper 24855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1995. " How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 173-84, April.
    16. Goldsmith, Arthur A., 2001. "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(01), pages 123-148, December.
    17. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
    2. Enrique Calfucura, 2011. "Natural Resources, Conflict and Democratization," Working Papers 30, Facultad de EconomĂ­a y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.

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