From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions
AbstractThis article explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents. It underlines a tension between the theoretical justification of contractual incompleteness on the one hand, and rationality postulate, on the other hand. It concludes the relevance of bounded rationality assumption and temporary equilibrium framework to overcome some logical incoherences of present incomplete contracts literature. This brings closer two important branches of new institutional economics, namely the Transaction Costs Economics and the Property Rights approach.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37887.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision: 2002
Publication status: Published in Economie et Institutions No. 1.Vol 1(2002): pp. 99-143
Incomplete contracts; Judge bounded rationaly; Agent's bounded rationality; Asymmetric information; Walrasian general equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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