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Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

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Author Info
Hart, Oliver D

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 4 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 119-39
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39

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  2. Daniel Maceira & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2001. "Reforma del sector social en América Latina y el papel de los sindicatos," RES Working Papers 4276, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Greet Asselbergh, 2002. "Financing firms with restricted access to financial markets: the use of trade credit and factoring in Belgium," European Journal of Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 2-20, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sergio Torres Valdivieso & Rafael Guillermo García Cáceres & John Jairo Quintero, 2005. "Formas de contratación de los servicios de urgencias: una aproximación desde la economía de los costos de transacción," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(12), pages 209-237, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kirsten Foss, 1998. "Technological Interdependencies,Specialization and Coordination A Property Rights Perspective on The Nature of the Firm," DRUID Working Papers 98-10, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Valeria Sodano, 2006. "Power and the Analysis of the Food System," Department of Economics University of Siena 478, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Ownership Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights," DRUID Working Papers 99-4, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  8. Susheng Wang & Tian (Tim) Zhu, 2000. "Bargaining, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights Allocation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0373, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance," Microeconomics 9705001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2005. "Appropriating Economic Rents from Resources: An Integrative Property Rights and Resource-Based Approach," Working Papers 05-0123, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  11. Kirsten Foss, . "Economic Organization and the Accumulation of Rent-Earning Assets," IVS/CBS Working Papers 98-2, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School. [Downloadable!]
  12. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," NBER Working Papers 13235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242. [Downloadable!]
  15. Thomsen, Steen & Rose, Caspar, 2002. "Foundation ownership and financial performance. Do companies need owners?," Working Papers 2002-3, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance. [Downloadable!]
  16. Daniel Maceira & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2001. "Social Sector Reform in Latin America and the Role of Unions," RES Working Papers 4275, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  17. Paul Walker, 2008. "The (non)Theory of the Knowledge Firm," Working Papers in Economics 08/07, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
  19. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 1998. "The Market Process and The Firm Toward a Dynamic Property Rights Perspective," DRUID Working Papers 98-14, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  20. Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, . "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Working Papers 97050, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives," Working Paper 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
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