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Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets

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Author Info
James M. Malcomson

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Abstract

The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generate wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment contracts that induce efficient specific investments by both firm and employee are problematic so it makes sense, wherever possible, for one side to make all such investments. With private information, fixed wages may induce fewer inefficient separations than employment at will.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 1916-1957
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:35:y:1997:i:4:p:1916-1957

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  1. Bernard Baudry & Bruno Tinel, 2003. "Une analyse théorique des fondements et du fonctionnement de la relation d'autorité intrafirme," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270902_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  2. Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2001. "Insurance within the Firm," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 414, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Brunello, Giorgio & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Sanz-de-Galdeano, Anna, 2008. "The Rise in Obesity across the Atlantic: An Economic Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 3529, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick Schmitz, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Papers 281, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Steinar Holden, 2004. "Wage formation under low inflation," Working Paper 2004/14, Norges Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Nicola Meccheri, 2008. "A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms," Discussion Papers 2008/72, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Guth, W. & Kroger, S. & Maug, E., 2003. "You may have to do it again, Rocky! - An expirimental analysis of bargaining with risky joint profits -," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Maxim Bouev, 2005. "State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp764, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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