Measurement Distortion And Missing Contingencies In Optimal Contracts

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Measurement Distortion And Missing Contingencies In Optimal Contracts

Author Info

ALLEN, F.
GALE, D.

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research in its series Weiss Center Working Papers with number 26-90.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pennif:26-90

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Article
- Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1992. "Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-26, January.

Cited by:
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Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CEPR Discussion Papers 2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," IEW - Working Papers iewwp072, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," Discussion Papers in Economics 18, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
TIROLE, Jean, 2008. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 453, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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- Jean Tirole, 2009. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 265-94, March. [Downloadable!]
Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2002. "Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 798-817, September. [Downloadable!]
Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," ESE Discussion Papers 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 2293, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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- Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June. [Downloadable!]
Constanza M. Fosco Perea M, . "Ambigüedad estratégica en contratos públicos de suministro," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv127, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," IZA Discussion Papers 1203, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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- Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 4512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, . "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," IEW - Working Papers iewwp193, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Eduardo Saavedra, . "Renegotiating Imcomplete Contracts: Over and Under Investment of Concessioned Public Infrastructure," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv106, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
Hirschauer, Norbert & Zwoll, Stefan, 2006. "Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production," Working Paper Series 10287, Humboldt University Berlin, Institute for Agricultural Economic and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Norbert Hirschauer & Stefan Zwoll, 2008. "Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 27-60, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Miglo, A., 2008. "Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2008-12, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, . "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers iewwp250, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December. [Downloadable!]
DESSI, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution and Strategic Incompleteness," IDEI Working Papers 465, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
João Cabral dos Santos, 1995. "Debt and equity as optimal contracts," Working Paper 9505, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Santos, Joao C., 1997. "Debt and equity as optimal contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 355-366, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu, Miles B. Gietzmann, 1998. "Auditor independence, incomplete contracts and the role of legal liability," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 355-375, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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