Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 90-140.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econwp.html
More information through EDIRC
Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Other versions of this item:
- Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4j76f10g, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 42-75, January.
- Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009.
"Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
- Andrew Newman & Philip Bond, 2004. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 143, Econometric Society.
- Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2005. "Financial innovations and corporate bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-317, July.
- Elul, Ronel, 2008. "Collateral, credit history, and the financial decelerator," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-88, January.
- Michelle J. White, 2011. "Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 17237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-13-00001 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hviid, Morten, 1996. "Default rules and equilibrium selection of contract terms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 233-245, June.
- Signorotti, Claudio, 2000. "Efficiency of legal restrictions on contracts in the presence of two signals," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 511-535, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004.
"Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
- Danziger, Leif, 1995. "Discrete shocks and fixed duration of labor contracts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 359-379, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.