Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
AbstractThis article presents a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness. I show that in the presence of transactions costs, incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal's type. Two types of transactions costs are considered: those incurred ex ante (drafting costs) and those incurred ex post (enforcement or verification costs). I prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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