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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 432-443
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:autumn:p:432-443

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