An Economic Analysis of Slavery
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1977)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
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- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011.
"Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs : a critical survey,"
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
- Ron Rogowski, 2013. "Slavery: a dual-equilibrium model with some historical examples," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 189-209, June.
- Flávio Rabelo Versiani & Maria Eduarda Tannuri-Pianto & José Raimundo Oliveira Vergolino, 2003. "Demand Factors in the Nineteenth-Century Brazilian Slave Market," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] a31, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
- Mark Yanochik & Bradley Ewing & Mark Thornton, 2001. "A new perspective on antebellum slavery: Public policy and slave prices," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 330-340, September.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1990. "Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers 871, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kritikos, Alexander S., 2000. "Indenture: an institution for a credible commitment without extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 397-403, November.
- Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "Protection costs, transaction costs,and economic theory," MPRA Paper 17648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck, 2002. "The Gains From Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women's Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1079-1092, September.
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