A Deferential Role for Efficiency Analysis in Unravelling the Takings Tangle
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 24 (1997)
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- Farber, Daniel A., 1992. "Economic analysis and just compensation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-138, June.
- Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2002.
"Economic analysis of law,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1661-1784
- Blume, Lawrence & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92, February.
- Paul Burrows, 1999. "A Deferential Role for Efficiency Theory in Analysing Causation-Based Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 29-49, July.
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