Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property
AbstractThis article constructs an economic model of government takings in which some property owners develop their land earlier than others. Because it is efficient for the government to "take" undeveloped land before developed land, uncompensated takings will give landowners an incentive to develop their property early in order to reduce the risk of government appropriation. This overdevelopment incentive can be countered, and efficiency thereby restored, if landowners are appropriately compensated when their property is taken, or if "equal treatment" is afforded to owners of developed and undeveloped land. However, when the government responds to political pressure, a judicial compensation requirement will often lead to less government land use regulation than is efficient. In contrast, a judicial equal treatment requirement can elicit efficient development and regulatory decisions. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 40 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Niemann, Paul & Shapiro, Perry, 2008. "Efficiency and fairness: Compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 157-165, September.
- Janmaat, John, 2008. "Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 455-473, August.
- Lange, Andreas & Liu, Xiangping, 2013. "Land Development Restrictions and Preemptive Action- On the benefits of differentiated regulation," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 151283, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher & Solow, Andrew, 2005. "The Economics of Biodiversity," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1517-1560 Elsevier.
- Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Polasky, Stephen & Doremus, Holly, 1998. "When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 22-47, January.
- Winfree, Jason A. & McCluskey, Jill J., 2007. "Takings of development rights with asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 320-333, November.
- Robert Innes & George Frisvold, 2009. "The Economics of Endangered Species," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 485-512, 09.
- Michael, Jeffrey A., 1998. "Preemptive Habitat Destruction And The Endangered Species Act: The Case Of The Red-Cockaded Woodpecker," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20783, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
- Robert Innes & Stephen Polasky & John Tschirhart, 1998. "Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 35-52, Summer.
- Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2010. "Irreversible development and eminent domain: Compensation rules, land use and efficiency," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 243-254, December.
- Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2004. "Development moratoria," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 155-169, September.
- Geoffrey Turnbull, 2012. "Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 305-325, August.
- Osgood, Daniel E. & List, John A. & Margolis, Michael, 2002. "Closing The Barn Door: Construction And Endangered Species Restrictions," 2002 Annual Meeting, July 28-31, 2002, Long Beach, California 36598, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.