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Protection against Government Takings: Compensation for Regulation?

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Author Info
Kevin Guerin () (The Treasury)

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Abstract

The paper responds to recent debate in New Zealand on the power of the government to take private property, directly or through regulatory constraints. This aspect of regulation has received less attention in New Zealand than it warrants. This paper addresses the issue of which protections against takings are appropriate, and the role of compensation as a protective device. A taking can be broadly defined an act by which a government assumes or assigns control over all or part of a property right held by a private party. Government regulation is typically not treated as a taking. In practice, compensation is normally required only for physical takings, such as the acquisition of land, and is not available for takings through regulation, such as restricting the right to use land in a particular way. New Zealand has three options for improved protection against takings: a tighter regime for scrutinising the quality of regulation, more restricted takings powers, and extended compensation provisions. The desirability and practicality of a greater role for compensation requires, however, more detailed consideration. The paper aims to stimulate further debate in this area as an aspect of the wider debate on regulatory quality.

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File URL: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2002/02-18/twp02-18.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New Zealand Treasury in its series Treasury Working Paper Series with number 02/18.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nzt:nztwps:02/18

Contact details of provider:
Postal: New Zealand Treasury, PO Box 3724, Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64-4-472 2733
Fax: +64-4-473 0982
Web page: http://www.treasury.govt.nz
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Geraldine Bruin).

Related research
Keywords: Eminent Domain Compensation Regulatory Takings Police Power Public Works Land Use

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kevin Guerin, 2001. "Regulatory Harmonisation - Issues for New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/01, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fischel, William A & Shapiro, Perry, 1988. "Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 269-93, June.
  3. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-76, June.
  4. Munch, Patricia, 1976. "An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 473-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kevin Guerin, 2002. "Subsidiarity: Implications for New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 02/03, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  6. Blume, Lawrence & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
  8. Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Esposto, Fred G, 1996. " The Political Economy of Taking and Just Compensation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(3-4), pages 267-82, December.
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.


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