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Public Goods, Taxes, and Takings

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  • Thomas Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) first showed that compensation for takings can lead to a moral hazard problem that results in overinvestment in land suitable for public use. To the contrary, this paper shows that the compensation rule is irrelevant regarding the level of investment landowners make in their property, as well as the amount of land they authorize the government to acquire, both of which will be efficient. Intuitively, landowners recognize the equivalence of taxes and takings in budgetary terms, causing the distortionary effects of compensation and property taxation to cancel each other out through the balanced budget condition.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2007-02.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-02.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-02

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Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
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Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: Compensation for takings; eminent domain; moral hazard; public goods;

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References

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  1. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko & Raven E. Saks, 2005. "Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2061, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Nosal, Ed, 2001. "The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 431-443, December.
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Bagwell, Kyle, 1988. "Is Everything Neutral?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 308-38, April.
  4. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
  5. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-76, June.
  6. Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-62, June.
  7. Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
  8. Ghosh, Shubha, 1997. "Takings, the exit option and just compensation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-176, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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