An Economic Analysis of Takings
AbstractThis article identifies economically efficient rules for governing compensation when the state takes private property. Despite a variety of informational and behavioral assumptions, a basic principle emerges: a fully efficient rule entails compensation based on the gains society enjoys from the taking (either its actual gains or its expected gains). Moreover, in many takings situations this principle can be implemented in more than one way, providing society some flexibility with which to achieve its other goals without sacrificing economic efficiency. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 11 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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