Information about:
Robert Innes

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Affiliation

• Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
  University of Arizona

  Location: Tucson, Arizona (United States)
  Homepage: http://ag.arizona.edu/AREC/
  Email:
  Phone:
  Fax:
  Postal:
  Handle: RePEc:edi:dauazus (registered authors at this institution)

• Economics Department
  University of Arizona

  Location: Tucson, Arizona (United States)
  Homepage: http://w3.arizona.edu/~econ/
  Email:
  Phone: (520) 621-6224
  Fax: (520) 621-8450
  Postal: McClelland Hall 401, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721
  Handle: RePEc:edi:eduazus (registered authors at this institution)

Lists

1. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
2. Number of Journal Pages
3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
5. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
6. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
7. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Articles

1. Hai-Lan Yang & Robert Innes, 2007. "Economic Incentives and Residential Waste Management in Taiwan: An Empirical Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(3), pages 489-519, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Robert Innes, 2006. "ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 369-395, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Innes, Robert & Hamilton, Stephen F., 2006. "Naked slotting fees for vertical control of multi-product retail markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 303-318, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Robert Innes, 2006. "A Theory of Consumer Boycotts under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 355-381, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Robert Innes, 2004. "Fines, Appeals and Liability in Public Enforcement with Stochastic Damage and Asymmetric Information," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(283), pages 391-416, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

6. Innes, Robert, 2004. "Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 29-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

7. Robert Innes, 2003. "Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 198-215, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

8. Innes, Robert, 2003. "Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 546-568, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

9. Robert Innes, 2003. "Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 85(2), pages 318-335, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

10. Innes, Robert & Bial, Joseph J, 2002. "Inducing Innovation in the Environmental Technology of Oligopolistic Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(3), pages 265-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

11. Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-56, April.

12. Innes, Robert, 2000. "Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 287-300, January.

13. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 181-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

14. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

15. Robert Innes, 1999. "Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1305-1325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

16. Innes, Robert & Polasky, Stephen & Tschirhart, John, 1998. "Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 35-52, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

17. Innes, Robert, 1997. "Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 403-32, October.

18. Innes, Robert, 1996. "Regulating Automobile Pollution under Certainty, Competition, and Imperfect Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 219-239, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

19. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J, 1994. "Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 566-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

20. Innes, Robert, 1993. "Financial Contracting under Risk Neutrality, Limited Liability and Ex ante Asymmetric Information," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 60(237), pages 27-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

21. Innes, Robert, 1993. "Two-Season Subsistence Farming, Urban Food Subsidies and Optimal Agricultural Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 668-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

22. Innes, Robert, 1993. "Debt, Futures and Options: Optimal Price-Linked Financial Contracts under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 271-95, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

23. Ardila Sergio & Innes Robert, 1993. "Risk, Risk Aversion, and On-Farm Soil Depletion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages S27-S45, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

24. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Customer coalitions, monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1569-1597, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

25. Saha, Atanu & Innes, Robert & Pope, Rulon, 1993. "Production and savings under uncertainty," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 365-375. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

26. Innes, Robert, 1992. "Adverse selection, investment, and profit taxation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 1427-1452, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

27. Innes, Robert, 1991. "Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-381, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

28. Innes, Robert, 1990. "Government Target Price Intervention in Economies with Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1035-52, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

29. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. Innes, Robert, 2002. "Market failures and second-best analysis with a focus on nutrition, credit, and incomplete markets," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1827-1892 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.