Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 107 (1999)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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