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Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

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Innes, Robert

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-3WG36Y6-3/2/f81a213912669f9d3a2e9fc5b10e9739
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 72 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 379-393
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:72:y:1999:i:3:p:379-393

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Tim Friehe, 2006. "Fairness and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 612.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 673.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005. "An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 2005-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sarah Stafford, 2006. "Rational or Confused Polluters? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Compliance," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1623-1623. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Motchenkova, Evgenia & Laan, Rob van der, 2005. "Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2007. "Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0060, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law," NBER Working Papers 9698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing," Working Papers 27, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, revised 13 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  14. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  15. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalities and inducement of self-reporting," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06048a, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  16. Feess,Eberhard & Walzl,Markus, 2005. "Quid-Pro-Quo or Winner-Takes-It-All? An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for EU and US Policies," Research Memoranda 039, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  17. Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, . "Corporate leniency programs in the EU and the USA," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1077, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  18. Garoupa, Nuno & Stephen, Frank, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid," CEPR Discussion Papers 4113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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