Medical Errors: Getting the Incentives Right
AbstractThis work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) induces the first-best solution. However, this scheme does not necessarily imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative sanction systems, such as voluntary reporting and immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. Finally, the examination of various penalty restrictions (scope and scale) shows that such barriers may promote both tougher and softer sanction schemes. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106603
reporting incentives; immunity; confidentiality; voluntary reporting;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Danzon, Patricia M & Pauly, Mark V & Kington, Raynard S, 1990.
"The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physicians' Fees and Incomes,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 122-27, May.
- Pauly Danzon. Patricia M. & Kington Mark V. & Raynard S., 1990. "The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physicians' Fees and Incomes," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 59, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 2002. "Malpractice law and health care reform: optimal liability policy in an era of managed care," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 175-197, May.
- Harford, Jon D., 1987. "Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 293-303, September.
- James Thornton, 1999. "The impact of medical malpractice insurance cost on physician behaviour: the role of income and tort signal effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 779-794.
- Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
- Danzon, Patricia M., 2000.
"Liability for medical malpractice,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1339-1404
- Border, Kim C & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 525-40, October.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994.
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
- Patricia M Danzon, 1990. "Alternative Liability Regimes for Medical Injuries," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(1), pages 3-21, January.
- Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sloan, Frank A, 1990. "Experience Rating: Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 128-33, May.
- Dubay, Lisa & Kaestner, Robert & Waidmann, Timothy, 1999. "The impact of malpractice fears on cesarean section rates," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 491-522, August.
- Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
- Jensen, Gail A. & Spurr, Stephen J. & Weycker, Derek A. & Bulycheva, Maria, 1999. "Physicians and the risk of medical malpractice: The role of prior litigation in predicting the future," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 267-289.
- Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kang, HeeChung & Hong, JaeSeok & Lee, KwangSoo & Kim, Sera, 2010. "The effects of the fraud and abuse enforcement program under the National Health Insurance program in Korea," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 41-49, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.