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Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement

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Author Info
Swierzbinski Joseph E.
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-45P0K3K-B/2/dc7367d6528849f49d20937635e26a09
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 27 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 127-146
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:27:y:1994:i:2:p:127-146

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hans W. Gottinger, 2000. "Environmental Regulation with Optimal Monitoring and Enforcement," CSEF Working Papers 49, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Blackman, Allen & Harrington, Winston, 1999. "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution," Discussion Papers dp-99-39, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  5. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Optimal environmental standards under asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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