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Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
  2. Millock, Katrin & Xabadia, Angels & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 102-116.
  3. Gustafsson, Bo, 1998. "Scope and limits of the market mechanism in environmental management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 259-274, February.
  4. Millock, Katrin & Sunding, David & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Regulating Pollution with Endogenous Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-241, September.
  5. Iskandar, Deden Dinar & Wuenscher, Tobias & Badhuri, Anik, 2012. "The Determinants of Compliance on Environmental Tax: The Insights of Theoretical and Experimental Approaches Motivated by the Case of Indonesia," 86th Annual Conference, April 16-18, 2012, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 134977, Agricultural Economics Society.
  6. Ya-Po Yang & Jin-Li Hu, 2012. "Gresham’s law in environmental protection," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 103-122, April.
  7. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
  8. Brennan, Donna C., 1999. "Pollution Control Policies For Australian Prawn Farms," 1999 Conference (43th), January 20-22, 1999, Christchurch, New Zealand 123774, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  9. Lehmann, Paul, 2008. "Using a Policy Mix for Pollution Control – A Review of Economic Literature," MPRA Paper 21354, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
  11. Blackman, Allen & Harrington, Winston, 1999. "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution," RFF Working Paper Series dp-99-39, Resources for the Future.
  12. Schmutzler, Armin & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1997. "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-64, January.
  13. Bontems, P. & Bourgeon, J.M., 2002. "Technological standards, environmental taxation and pollution monitoring," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 40, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  14. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
  15. Evans, Mary F. & Gilpatric, Scott M. & Liu, Lirong, 2009. "Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 284-292, May.
  16. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
  17. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
  18. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
  19. Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, 2002. "The Case for a Two-Part Instrument: Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subsidy," Chapters, in: Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman (ed.), The Economics of Household Garbage and Recycling Behavior, chapter 10, pages 175-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  20. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
  21. Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
  22. Philippe Bontems & Jean‐Marc Bourgeon, 2007. "On Environmental Policy and Permitting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 771-792, October.
  23. Katrin Millock & Angels Xabadia & David Zilberman, 2009. "Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities," Post-Print halshs-00367888, HAL.
  24. Hans W. Gottinger, 2000. "Environmental Regulation with Optimal Monitoring and Enforcement," CSEF Working Papers 49, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  25. Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
  26. Sproul, Thomas W. & Zilberman, David, 2011. "Accidents Happen: The Effect of Uncertainty on Environmental Policy Design," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103927, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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