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Technological standards, environmental taxation and pollution monitoring

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Author Info
Bontems, P.
Bourgeon, J.M.

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Abstract

We consider the combine use of environmental taxation and technological standards of abatement. While it is not necessary to regulate technology adoption under complete information, we show that the environmental agency has to impose a technological standard when monitoring emissions is costly and when pollution benefits are the firm's private information. Although this policy constrains firms with low pollution benefits to over-invest compared to laissez-faire, it leads to a cut in informational rents and a decrease in the protifs firms would extract from evading taxation. Incentives for tax evasion are therefore reduced and tax collection is increased. ...French Abstract : Les auteurs considèrent, dans cet article, l'usage combiné de la taxation environnementale et de la norme de technologie de dépollution. Alors qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de réguler l'adoption de technologie en information complète, ils montrent que l'agence de l'environnement doit imposer une norme de technologie de dépollution lorsque la mesure des émissions est coûteuse et lorsque le coût d'opportunité de la pollution est une information privée des pollueurs. Bien que cette politique induit un surinvestissement des firmes ayant un faible bénéfice lié à la pollution émise, comparativement à une politique de laissez-faire, cela conduit à diminuer le coût d'agence et le profit que les firmes peuvent potentiellement retirer d'une fraude fiscale. Les incitations à la fraude sont ainsi réduites et le montant des taxes collectées est accru.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse) in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) with number 40.

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Length: 35 p.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:40

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Postal: INRA ESR - BP27 - 31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex - France
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Related research
Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION; LAW ENFORCEMENT; TECHNOLOGICAL STANDARD; ADVERSE SELECTION ; ECONOMIE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT; LUTTE ANTIPOLLUTION; TAXE; NORME; TECHNOLOGIE PROPRE;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jullien, Bruno, 1997. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," IDEI Working Papers 67, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    Other versions:
  5. Stranlund, John K., 1997. "Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to Environmental Standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 228-239, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jaffe Adam B. & Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S43-S63, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Parry, Ian W. H., 1995. "Optimal pollution taxes and endogenous technological progress," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 69-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Magat, Wesley A., 1978. "Pollution control and technological advance: A dynamic model of the firm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Border, Kim C & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 525-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K, 1995. "Pollution Regulation and Incentives for Pollution-Control Research," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(4), pages 663-84, Winter.
  15. Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 18-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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