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Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement Policy

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  • P. Bontems
  • J-M. Bourgeon

Abstract

Les auteurs étudient la politique optimale d'inspection et de taxation des émissions polluantes lorsque : (i) les coûts de réduction de la pollution sont inconnus du régulateur, (ii) les amendes pour fraude fiscale sont limitées supérieurement et (iii) le contrôle des polluants est coûteux. Ils montrent que la menace d'être contrôlé altère les incitations usuelles des firmes à surestimer leurs coûts de réduction de la pollution. En particulier, selon le coût, la politique optimale peut impliquer une sur-dissuasion ou une sous-dissuasion en termes de niveaux de pollution par rapport à la situation d'information parfaite. Dans une seconde partie, ils analysent les propriétés d'une politique basée sur une norme de rejets polluants. Les auteurs montrent que cette politique est proche (bien que moins efficace) d'une taxation des polluants associée à la norme lorsqu'on prend en compte les incitations économiques apportées par le mécanisme d'audit.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2000-56.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2000-56

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  1. Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1995. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 9501, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
  3. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
  4. Malik, Arun S, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 714-21, October.
  5. Swierzbinski Joseph E., 1994. "Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 127-146, September.
  6. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 819-847, Winter.
  7. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
  8. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis L, 1998. "A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 165-83, January.
  9. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October.
  10. Border, Kim C & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 525-40, October.
  11. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May.
  12. Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November.
  13. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-30, July.
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