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Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau

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  • Sandrine Spaeter

    (UMR 7522 CNRS;Université de Strasbourg;61, avenue de la Forêt Noire;67085 STRASBOURG Cedex, France)

  • Alban Verchère

    (Université de Saint-Etienne / IUT, France)

Abstract

When information on farmers’ farming methods is incomplete, it isnot optimal to fight water pollution due to their activities exclusively through a tax policy. Symmetrically, subsidies alone are not appropriate for some cereals which are already widely subsidized in the European Union. In this paper, we show that a contract between the farmer and the regulator with random audit, penalties or financial compensations depending on the environmental effort of the farmer, could be another alternative for Society. The relevance of such an audit policy depends on the reliability of the informations given by some indicators on the pedological, hydrological and agronomic characteristics of cultivated soils. From the practical point of view, we discuss the consistency and also the availability of such indicators in the case of the Alsatian groundwater pollution by agricultural activities. We also describe the main features of the audit system adopted in some water catchment areas in Germany (Baden-Wurttemberg).

Suggested Citation

  • Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:71:y:2004:p:5-35
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pollution agricole; nitrates; aléa moral; audit; contrat; optimal;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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