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Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Tun Lin (Department of Economics, University of Cambridge)
Timo Goeschl (Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge)
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This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2004.55.
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Date of creation: Mar 2004Date of revision:
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Keywords: Biodiversity conservation Information Regulatory tools Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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