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Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard

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Xepapadeas, A. P.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 113-126
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:20:y:1991:i:2:p:113-126

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  1. Lars Hansen, 2002. "Regulation of Non-Point Emissions – A Variance Based Mechanism," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(4), pages 303-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. James Shortle & David Abler & Richard Horan, 1998. "Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 571-585, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  4. John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Gerhard Clemenz, 1999. "Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(1), pages 13-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2004. "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment," Working papers 2004-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Chung-Huang Huang, 1996. "Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 183-204, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kathleen Segerson & JunJie Wu, 2003. "Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats," Working papers 2003-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2000. "Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings," Working Papers 9/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  12. Richard Horan & James Shortle & David Abler, 2002. "Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(2), pages 189-202, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004. "Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures," Working Papers 54/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Lars Hansen, 1998. "A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 99-112, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. C. Rendleman & Kenneth Reinert & James Tobey, 1995. "Market-based systems for reducing chemical use in agriculture in the United States," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 51-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Larry Karp, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 835, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Alfons Weersink & John R. Livernois & Jason F. Shogren & James S. Shortle, 1998. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Agriculture," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 309-327, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. JunJie Wu & Bruce Babcock, 2001. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 173-192, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Katrin Millock & François Salanié, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1233-1233. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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