Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information
AbstractGreen payment programs, by which the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper examines a green payment program applied to irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a conjoint source of pollution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University in its series Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications with number 95-wp131.
Date of creation: Feb 1995
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(02), December.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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