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Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known

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  • Tracy R. Lewis

Abstract

In this survey I analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction. The presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution. For instance, it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels. I conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199624%2927%3A4%3C819%3APTEWCA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23&origin=repec
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 819-847

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:winter:p:819-847

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Cited by:
  1. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & McKitrick, Ross & Rollins, Kimberly S., 1999. "Optimal Compensation For Endangered Species Protection Under Asymmetric Information," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21693, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  2. Rüdiger Pethig, 1999. "On the Future of Environmental Economics," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 77-99, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  3. Guasch, J Luis & Hahn, Robert W, 1999. "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 137-58, February.
  4. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Parry, Ian W. H. & Williams III, Roberton C. & Burtraw, Dallas, 1999. "The cost-effectiveness of alternative instruments for environmental protection in a second-best setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 329-360, June.
  5. Arvind Magesan & Matthew A. Turner, 2008. "The Value of Information in Public Decisions," Working Papers tecipa-345, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  6. Bartzokas, Anthony & Yarime, Masaru, 1997. "Technology Trends in Pollution-Intensive Industries: A Review of Sectoral Trends," UNU-INTECH Discussion Paper Series 06, United Nations University - INTECH.
  7. Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2002. "Rethinking local commons dilemmas: Lessons from experimental economics in the field," Artefactual Field Experiments 00020, The Field Experiments Website.
  8. Woodward, Richard T., 2011. "Double-dipping in environmental markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 153-169, March.
  9. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
  10. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2004. "Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches to Mitigating Climate Change," Working Papers 2004-28, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.

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