Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments with Externality Among Polluters:An Experimental Study

Contents:

Author Info

  • François Cochard
  • Marc Willinger
  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

Abstract

In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluter’s individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments: an input based tax, an ambient tax, and a group fine. We assume that the polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages. A control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the “status quo” situation. Our experimental data show that the input tax is almost perfectly efficient and very reliable, and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable. Both instruments improve welfare with respect to the status quo. On the contrary, the ambient tax decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo, and its effect is very unreliable.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/productions/publications/2002/2002-20.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2002-20.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2002-20

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la Forêt-Noire 67000 Strasbourg
Phone: +33 3 68 85 20 69
Fax: +33 3 68 85 20 70
Email:
Web page: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Environmental Economics; Experimental Economics; Nonpoint source pollution; Regulation; Input Tax; Ambient Tax.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
  2. Lars Hansen, 1998. "A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 99-112, July.
  3. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
  4. Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994. "Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. repec:att:wimass:9406 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Observability And Choice Of Instrument Mix In The Control Of Externalities," Working Papers, University of Crete, Department of Economics 9401, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  7. Plott, Charles R., . "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 180, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Millock, Katrin & Sunding, David & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Regulating Pollution with Endogenous Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-241, September.
  9. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
  10. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
  11. John Spraggon, 2003. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications, McMaster University 2003-02, McMaster University.
  12. James Andreoni, 1997. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671, David K. Levine.
  13. Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
  14. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March.
  15. Willinger, Marc & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-328, December.
  16. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December.
  17. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
  18. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The Regulation of Non-Point Sources of Pollution Under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 10787, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  19. James Shortle & David Abler & Richard Horan, 1998. "Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 571-585, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Camacho Cuena, Eva & Requate, Till, 2004. "Collective and Random Fining versus Tax/Subsidy - Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Pollution : An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics 2004,10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  2. Pushkarskaya, Helen N., 2006. "Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Water Pollution: Making Sense of Experimental Results," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 21111, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  3. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2002-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.