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The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities

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  • Franckx, Laurent

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 71-92

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:1:p:71-92

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn.
  2. Beavis, Brian & Dobbs, Ian, 1987. "Firm behaviour under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 112-127, June.
  3. Grieson, Ronald E. & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Regulating externalities through testing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 369-387, April.
  4. Beavis, Brian & Walker, Martin, 1981. "Pollution Control with Imperfect Monitoring-An Alternative Formulation [The Criminal Waste Discharger]," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 28(1), pages 92-94, February.
  5. Storey, D J & McCabe, P J, 1980. "The Criminal Waste Discharger," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 30-40, February.
  6. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
  7. Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Observability And Choice Of Instrument Mix In The Control Of Externalities," Working Papers, University of Crete, Department of Economics 9401, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  8. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
  9. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March.
  10. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
  11. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
  12. Harford, Jon D., 1991. "Measurement error and state-dependent pollution control enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-81, July.
  13. Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
  14. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
  15. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
  16. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
  17. Farber, Stephen C & Martin, Robert E, 1986. "Market Structure and Pollution Control under Imperfect Surveillance," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 147-60, December.
  18. Harford, Jon D., 1987. "Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 293-303, September.
  19. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
  20. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October.
  21. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
  22. Chambers, Robert G. & Quiggin, John, 1996. "Non-point-source pollution regulation as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 95-116, January.
  23. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
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