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A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted

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Author Info
Harford, Jon D.
Harrington, Winston

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-459113M-36/2/6be84e20c6daa1ce20339b4073b18e14
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 391-395
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:45:y:1991:i:3:p:391-395

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marette, Stéphan, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Staff General Research Papers 12451, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
  6. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  7. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Ching-Chong Lai & Chih-Yu Yang & Juin-Jen Chang, 2003. "Environmental Regulations and Social Norms," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Francisco J. André & Abderrahmane Sokri & Georges Zaccour, 2009. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. Traditional Approaches for Environmental Regulation: Green Goodwill and the Policies of the Firm," Working Papers 09.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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