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Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Cohen, Mark A

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 23-51
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:30:y:1987:i:1:p:23-51

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  1. Rousseau Sandra, 2007. "The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms’ Environmental Compliance Decisions," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0704, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  2. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bolin, Kristian, 1999. "The Ownership Of Funds And Systems For Reparation Of Very Large Accidents," Working Papers 1999:006, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1992. "Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges," NBER Working Papers 4176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Boyd, James, 1996. "Banking on "Green Money:" Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers dp-96-26, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  7. Montserrat Grau & Theodore Groves, 1997. "The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 315-339, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rousseau Sandra & Billiet Carole, 2005. "How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0510, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  9. Huennemeyer, Anne-J. & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Berrone, Pascual & Gelabert, Liliana & Fosfuri, Andrea & Gomez-Mejia, Luis R., 2007. "Can institutional forces create competitive advantage? An empirical examination of environmental innovation," IESE Research Papers D/723, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ayla Ogus, 2005. "A Model of Endogeneous Oil Spill Regulation," Others 0504004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ayla Ogus, 2005. "Estimating the Size of Oil Tanker Spills," Others 0504003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Theodore Groves & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe & Montserrat Viladrich, 1992. "Optimal Monitoring of Oil Spills: Control in a Stochastic, Dynamic Context," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-48, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  14. Dietrich Earnhart, 1998. "Civil Litigation, Access to Government-Held Information, and Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement in the Czech Republic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-141, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dietrich Earnhart, 2000. "Environmental “Citizen Suits†in the Czech Republic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 43-68, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


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