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Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes

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Author Info
Harford, Jon D.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 5 (1978)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 26-43
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:5:y:1978:i:1:p:26-43

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. David M. McEvoy & John K. Stranlund, 2007. "Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries," Working Papers 07-15, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Papers 2006-2, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dasgupta, Susmita & Laplante, Benoit & Namingi, Nlandu & Hua Wang, 2000. "Industrial environmental performance in China - the impact of inspections," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2285, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ing-Marie Andréasson-Gren, 1992. "Profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(5), pages 459-468, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005. "A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement," Working Papers 2005-1, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. WU, JunJie & Babcock., Bruce A., 1996. "Relative Efficiency of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Environmental Regulations (The)," Staff General Research Papers 1014, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
  10. Anderson, Lee G., 1989. "Enforcement Issues in Selecting Fisheries Management Policy," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 6(3). [Downloadable!]
  11. Matthieu Glachant, 2002. "The Political Economy of Water Effluent Charges in France: Why are Rates Kept Low?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 27-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ching-Chong Lai & Chih-Yu Yang & Juin-Jen Chang, 2003. "Environmental Regulations and Social Norms," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. John K. Stranlund & Wei Zhang, 2008. "Bankruptcy Risk and Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes," Working Papers 2008-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Clifford Nowell & Jason F. Shogren, 1991. "Challenging the Enforcement of Environmental Regulation," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 91-wp80, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Optimal quota programs," Working Papers mturner-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Francisco J. André & Abderrahmane Sokri & Georges Zaccour, 2009. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. Traditional Approaches for Environmental Regulation: Green Goodwill and the Policies of the Firm," Working Papers 09.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. N.K. Warner-Merl, 1999. "An Emissions Tax in Siberia: Economic Theory, Firm Response, and Noncompliance in Imperfect Markets," Working Papers ir99027, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  21. Youngsoo Oh, 1995. "Surveillance Or Punishment? A Second-Best Theory Of Pollution Regulation," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 89-109, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Lankoski, Jussi & Lichtenberg, Erik & Ollikainen, Markku, 2008. "Agri-Environmental Program Compliance in a Heterogeneous Landscape," Working Papers 37797, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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