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Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations

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Author Info
Harford, Jon D.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 14 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 293-303
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:14:y:1987:i:3:p:293-303

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. David M. McEvoy & John K. Stranlund, 2007. "Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries," Working Papers 07-15, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ing-Marie Andréasson-Gren, 1992. "Profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(5), pages 459-468, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Carolos Chavez & John Stanlund, 2003. "Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(1), pages 65-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ching-Chong Lai & Chih-Yu Yang & Juin-Jen Chang, 2003. "Environmental Regulations and Social Norms," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John K. Stranlund & Wei Zhang, 2008. "Bankruptcy Risk and Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes," Working Papers 2008-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. E. Hentschel & A. Randall, 2000. "An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(1), pages 57-74, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 673.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. James A. Yunker, 2003. "Capital Wealth Inequality and Public Bads: A Mathematical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 105-119, Winter. [Downloadable!]
  11. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalities and inducement of self-reporting," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06048a, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Youngsoo Oh, 1995. "Surveillance Or Punishment? A Second-Best Theory Of Pollution Regulation," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 89-109, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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