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Enforcement, Regulation and Development Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jean-Jacques Laffont
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After discussing examples of enforcement failures for regulatory contracts in Africa, we develop a regulation model with asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement. Either the regulator succeeds in forcing the regulated firm to fulfill the contract or renegotiation takes place. The probability of renegotiation decreases with the level of enforcement expenditures which is chosen by the regulator. The model suggests that the endogenous level of enforcement decreases with the proneness to corruption, and increases and then decreases with the level of development. Finally, we document this relationship empirically. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of African Economies .
Volume (Year): 12 (2003)
Issue (Month): Supplement 2 (September)
Pages: 193-211
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:12:y:2003:i:supp2:p:193-211Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://www.jae.oupjournals.org/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, .
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Khalil, F., 1992.
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Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
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Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2004.
"Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America ,"
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103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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Other versions: Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M., 2006.
"Infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
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Other versions:
Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M, 2006.
"Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, 2008.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) David Bardey & Ramón Castaño, 2007.
"La regulación de tarifas en el sector de la salud en Colombia ,"
Revista de Economía Institucional ,
Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(17), pages 347-357, July-Dece.
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Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003.
"Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources such as Water ,"
IDEI Working Papers
2, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2004.
"Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Government's Budget Constraint ,"
IDEI Working Papers
459, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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