1. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • P. Bontems & J-M. Bourgeon, 2000. "Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement Policy," THEMA Working Papers 2000-56, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
6. Heyes, Anthony, 2002. "A Theory of Filtered Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 34-46, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit & Roy, Maite, 1998. "Can capital markets create incentives for pollution control?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 31-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Swierzbinski Joseph E., 1994. "Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 127-146, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J David, 2002. "Auditing with Signals," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1999. "Auditing with Signals," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    • Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2000. "Auditing with Signals," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0660, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
11. Dasgupta, Susmita & Laplante, Benoit & Mamingi, Nlandu & Wang, Hua, 2001. "Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 487-498, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Devon Garvie & Andrew Keeler, 1993. "Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice," Working Papers 873, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.

Cited by:
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1. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Papers 2006-2, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2006. "Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 672.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2007. "Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0060, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
   • Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2007. "Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in Emissions Trading Programs," Working Papers 2006-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June. [Downloadable!]
6. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
7. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 673.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Inés Macho-Stadler, 2008. "Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)