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A Theory of Filtered Enforcement

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  • Heyes, Anthony

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-458NC49-3/2/e694516fb521d4de216d8f7a98677f33
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 34-46

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:1:p:34-46

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
  4. Kleit, Andrew N & Pierce, Meredith A & Hill, R Carter, 1998. "Environmental Protection, Agency Motivations, and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 121-37, March.
  5. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
  6. Badrinath, S G & Bolster, Paul J, 1996. "The Role of Market Forces in EPA Enforcement Activity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 165-81, September.
  7. Raymond, Mark, 1999. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 289-295, August.
  8. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
  9. Oljaca, Neda & Keeler, Andrew G & Dorfman, Jeffrey, 1998. "Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 255-64, November.
  10. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
  2. Heather Eckert & Andrew Eckert, 2010. "The geographic distribution of environmental inspections," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, February.
  3. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
  4. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  5. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.
  6. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.

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