Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities
AbstractWith the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. In the paper, we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agent. The paper's contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. Each agent has to choose between paying a fixed fee or installing monitoring technology and paying a tax on actual emissions. We determine the second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 09010.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
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Externalities; environmental taxation; monitoring technology adoption; diffusion; nanotechnologies.;
Other versions of this item:
- Katrin Millock & Angels Xabadia & David Zilberman, 2009. "Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367888, HAL.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-05-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-23 (Environmental Economics)
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