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Specific versus General Enforcement of Law

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Author Info
Shavell, Steven

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Abstract

Optimal enforcement of law is examined in a model with specific enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed a single type of harmful act--and general enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed any of a range of harmful acts (a police officer on patrol, for instance, is able to apprehend many types of violators of law). If enforcement effort is specific, optimal sanctions are extreme for all acts. If enforcement effort is general, however, optimal sanctions rise with the harmfulness of acts and reach the extreme only for the most harmful acts. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 99 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1088-1108
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:99:y:1991:i:5:p:1088-1108

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano, 2003. "Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption," CSEF Working Papers 98, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Steven Shavell, 1989. "A Note on Optimal Deterrence When Individuals Choose Among Harmful Acts," NBER Working Papers 3061, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
    [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]    ," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2008. "The Economics of Search Warrants," Emory Economics 0810, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  7. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2000. "Amnesties and Co-operation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 259-273, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  9. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 4078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
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  14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Philip Curry & Steeve Mongrain, . "What You Don't See Can't Hurt You: An Economic Analysis of," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1062, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  16. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties without Commitment," Working Papers id:2014, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  17. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment," Working papers 175, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Joanne Roberts, 2000. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints and Deterrence," Working Papers jorob-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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