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Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

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Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Louis Kaplow

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Abstract

This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions. But when individuals imperfectly observe the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4079.

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Date of creation: Oct 1992
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4079

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 93-128, Spring.
  2. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 564, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Nuno Garoupa, 1998. "Crime and Punishment: Further Results," Economics Working Papers 344, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Pollution standards, costly monitoring and fines," Discussion Paper 9, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 4078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Numa Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 183-196, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Optimal environmental standards under asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Arguedas, Carmen, 2007. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2007/13, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
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