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Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation

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  • Marceau, Nicolas
  • Mongrain, Steeve

Abstract

This paper studies inter-jurisdictional competition in the fight against crime and its impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile, jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become either workers or criminals. Because the return of the two occupations depends on capital, and because investment in capital in a jurisdiction depends on its crime rate, there is a bi-directional relationship between capital investment and crime which may lead to capital concentration. By investing in costly law enforcement, a jurisdiction makes the choice of becoming a criminal less attractive, which in turn reduces the number of criminals and makes its territory more secure. This increased security increases the attractiveness of the jurisdiction for investors and this can eventually translate into more capital being invested. We characterize the Nash equilibria--some entailing a symmetric outcome, others an asymmetric one--and study their efficiency.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 69 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 136-147

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:69:y:2011:i:1:p:136-147

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

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Keywords: Crime Occupational choice Capital location Law enforcement;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Jenny Monheim & Marie Obidzinski, 2007. "Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2007-31, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  2. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau, 2007. "Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 0719, CIRPEE.
  3. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Régis Deloche, 2009. "On the optimal complexity of law and legal rules harmonization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 129-142, April.
  4. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany SFB649DP2006-027, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  5. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique, 2008. "Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 615-627, September.
  6. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Status concerns as a motive for crime?," DICE Discussion Papers, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 93, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  7. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2014-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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