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Hotelling Tax Competition

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Author Info
Wooders, Myrna
Zissimos, Ben

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Abstract

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which is possible, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 932.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_932

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Related research
Keywords: hotelling limit tax perfect tax discrimination tax competion

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979. "On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1986. "Tax Holidays as Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 820-26, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Douglas Wilson & Roger H. Gordon, 2003. "Expenditure Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 399-417, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(2), pages 217-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 2002. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 9290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 642, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Ian King & R. Preston McAfee & Linda Welling, 1993. "Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic Tax Competition and Public Investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 590-608, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Justman, M. & Thisse, J.-F. & van Ypersele, T., 2001. "Fiscal Competition and Regional Differentiation," Papers 0124, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Other versions:
  15. Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Roger H. Gordon & John D. Wilson, 1999. "Tax Structure and Government Behavior: Implications for Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 7244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Haaparanta, Pertti, 1996. "Competition for foreign direct investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 141-153, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Besley, Timothy J. & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Does Tax Competition Raise Voter Welfare?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 2002. "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry," Economics Discussion Papers 537, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben & Dhillon, Amrita, 2001. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 622, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. Hohaus, Bolko & Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 1994. "Too much conformity? : A hotelling model of local public goods supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 295-299. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2002. "Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 761-782, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Redoano, Michela, 2003. "Fiscal Interactions Among European Countries," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 680, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff & John Leach, 2004. "Capital Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms and Agglomeration Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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