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Expenditure Competition

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Author Info
John Douglas Wilson () (Michigan State University)
Roger H. Gordon (University of California, San Diego)

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Abstract

Given the temptation by government officials to use some of their budget for "perks," residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such "waste." The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore how the competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization affects "waste" in government. We find that such competition reduces waste, raises the utility of residents, and increases the desired supplies of public goods (potentially above the levels that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate). These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from "tax competition," and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 399-417
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:2:p:399-417

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John Anderson & Hendrik van den Berg, 1998. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An International Test for Leviathan Accounting for Unmeasured Economic Activity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 171-186, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hoxby, Caroline M., 1999. "The productivity of schools and other local public goods producers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Glaeser, Edward L, 1996. " The Incentive Effects of Property Taxes on Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 93-111, October.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Libman, Alexander, 2004. "Мировой Опыт Оптимизации Налогообложения: Роль Налоговой Конкуренции И Оффшорных Центров В Мировом Хозяйст�," MPRA Paper 17042, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, 2004. "Economic Effects of Regional Tax Havens," NBER Working Papers 10806, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Raghbendra Jha, 2001. "The Challenge of Fiscal Reform in India," ASARC Working Papers 2001-11, Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ben Zissimos & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation," Working Papers 0601, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roger H. Gordon & Wei Li, 2002. "Taxation and Economic Growth in China," Development Economics Working Papers 187, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rainald Borck, 2002. "Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 297, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Marko Köthenbürger, 2005. "Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 449-465, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Lars-Erik Borge & Jørn Rattsø, 2006. "Property taxation as incentive for cost control:Empirical evidence for utility services in Norway," Working Paper Series 7606, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Edmark, Karin, 2007. "Strategic Competition in Swedish Local Spending on Childcare, Schooling and Care for the Elderly," Working Paper Series 2007:21, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Wolfgang Eggert & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2007. "The Effects of Tax Competition when Politicians Create Rents to Buy Political Support," EPRU Working Paper Series 07-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Daniel Kaufmann & Gil Mehrez & Tugrul Gurgur, 2003. "Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials," Econometrics 0308004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben, 2003. "Hotelling Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Kersten Kellermann, 2008. "Should mobile capital pay for public infrastructure investment?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 129-143, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So," NBER Working Papers 9334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jørn Rattsø & Jon Hernes Fiva, 2005. "Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice," Working Paper Series 5305, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, revised 02 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
  16. Roger H. Gordon & John D. Wilson, 1999. "Tax Structure and Government Behavior: Implications for Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 7244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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