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Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms

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  • Robin Boadway

    (Queen's University, Canada)

  • Katherine Cuff

    (McMaster University, Canada)

  • Nicolas Marceau

    (UniversitÈ du QuÈbec ý MontrÈal, Canada)

Abstract

Regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs. The redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled, who cannot work. Able individuals may work, be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market, or choose to be voluntary unemployed. Labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies. Both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore, firms' location decisions. Allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient. If regions cannot tax firms, they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 761-782

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:3:p:761-782

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Cited by:
  1. Robin Boadway, 2001. "Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 93-121, June.
  2. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1105-1121, June.
  3. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 737, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Silvia Rocha‐Akis & Ronnie Schöb, 2011. "Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(1), pages 93-119, 03.
  5. Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2011. "Optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 580-604, October.
  6. C. Dembour, 2008. "Competition for Business Location: A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 89-111, June.
  7. Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben, 2003. "Hotelling Tax Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 668, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  8. Jun Oshiro, 2011. "Tariff Policy and Transport Costs under Reciprocal Dumping," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  9. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2002. "Advance Production Duopolies and Posted Prices or Market-Clearing Prices," Department of Economics Working Papers 2002-08, McMaster University.
  10. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2004. "Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(5), pages 623-645, 09.
  11. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.

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